

THE SAMKHYA PHILOSOPHY

CONTAINING

- (1) SÂMKHYA-PRAVACHANA SÛTRAM, WITH THE VRITTI OF ANIRUDDHA,
AND THE BHÂṢYA OF VIJNÂNA BHIKṢU AND EXTRACTS
FROM THE VRITTI-SÂRA OF MAHÂDEVA VEDANTIN;
(2) TATVA SAMÂSA ✓ (3) SÂMKHYA KÂRIKÂ ✓
(4) PANCHASÎKHÂ SÛTRAM. ✓

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DEPUTY MAGISTRATE, DALTONGANJ.

PUBLISHED BY

SUDHINDRA NATH VASU,

THE PÂṆINI OFFICE, BHUVANEŚWARÎ ÂŚRAMA, BAHADURGANJ,

Allahabad

PRINTED BY APURVA KRISHNA BOSE, AT THE INDIAN PRESS

1915

PREFACE.

The present volume of the *Sacred Books of the Hindus* which bears the modest title of the *Sâṃkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram*, is, in reality, a collection of all the available original documents of the School of the Sâṃkhyas, with the single exception of the commentary composed by Vyâsa on the *Sâṃkhya-Pravachana-Yoga-Sûtram* of Patañjali. For it contains in its pages not only the *Sâṃkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram* of Kapila together with the *Vṛitti* of Aniruddha, the *Bhâṣya* of Vijñâna Bhikṣu, and extracts of the original portions from the *Vṛittisâra* of Vedântin Mahâdeva, but also the *Tattva-Samâsa* together with the commentary of Narendra, the *Sâṃkhya-Kârikâ* of Īśvarakṛiṣṇa with profuse annotations based on the *Bhâṣya* of Gauḍapâda and the *Tattva-Kaumudî* of Vâchaspati Miśra, and a few of the Aphorisms of Pañchaśikha with explanatory notes according to the *Yoga-Bhâṣya* which has quoted them. An attempt, moreover, has been made to make the volume useful in many other respects by the addition, for instance, of elaborate analytical tables of contents to the *Sâṃkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram* and the *Sâṃkhya-Kârikâ*, and of a number of important appendices.

In the preparation of this volume, I have derived very material help from the excellent editions of the *Vṛitti* of Aniruddha and the *Bhâṣya* of Vijñâna Bhikṣu on the *Sâṃkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram* by Dr. Richard Garbe, to whom my thanks are due. And, in general, I take this opportunity of acknowledging my indebtedness to all previous writers on the Sâṃkhya, living and dead, from whose writings I have obtained light and leading in many important matters connected with the subject.

An introduction only now remains to be written. It is proposed, however, to write a separate monogram on the Sâṃkhya Darśana, which would be historical, critical and comparative, in its scope and character. In this preface, therefore, only a very brief account is given of some of the cardinal doctrines of the Sâṃkhya School.

The first and foremost among these is the *Sat-Kârya-Siddhânta* or the Established Tenet of Existent Effect. It is the Law of the Identity of Cause and Effect : what is called the cause is the unmanifested state of what is called the effect, and what is called the effect is only the manifested state of what

The Law of the
Identity of Cause and
Effect.

is called the cause ; their substance is one and the same ; differences of manifestation and non-manifestation give rise to the distinctions of Cause and Effect. The effect, therefore, is never non-existent ; whether before its production, or whether after its destruction, it is always existent in the cause. For, nothing can come out of nothing, and nothing can altogether vanish out of existence.

This doctrine would be better understood by a comparison with the contrary views held by other thinkers on the relation of cause and effect. But before we proceed to state these views, we should define the terms "cause" and "effect." One thing is said to be the cause of another thing, when the latter cannot be without the former. In its widest sense, the term, Cause, therefore, denotes an agent, an act, an instrument, a purpose, some material, time, and space. In fact, whatever makes the accomplishment of the effect possible, is one of its causes. And the immediate result of the operation of these causes, is their effect. Time and Space, however, are universal causes, inasmuch as they are presupposed in each and every act of causation. The remaining causes fall under the descriptions of

Definition of Cause and Effect.

Aristotelian Division of Causes.
The Sāṃkhya Division.

"Material," "Efficient," "Formal," and "Final." The Sāṃkhyas further reduce them to two descriptions only, viz., *Upādāna*, i.e., the material, which the Naiyāyikas call *Samavāyi* or Combinative or Constitutive, and *Nimitta*, i. e., the efficient, formal, and final, which may be variously, though somewhat imperfectly, translated as the instrumental, efficient, occasional, or conditional, because it includes the instruments with which, the agent by which, the occasion on which, and the conditions

Causes *Upādāna* and *Nimitta* distinguished.

under which, the act is performed. Obviously, there is a real distinction between the *Upādāna* and the *Nimitta* : the *Upādāna* enters into the constitution of the effect, and the power of taking the form of, in other words, the potentiality of being re-produced as, the effect, resides in it ; while the *Nimitta*, by the exercise of an extraneous influence only, co-operates with the power inherent in the material, in its re-production in the form of the effect, and its causality ceases with such re-production. To take the case of a coin, for example : the material causality was in a lump of gold ; it made possible the modification of the gold into the form of the coin, it will remain operative as long as the coin will last as a coin, and after its destruction, it will pass into the potential state again ; but the operation of the *Nimittas* came to an end as soon as the coin was minted.

Similarly, the Sâmkhyas distinguish the Effect under the twofold aspect of simple manifestation and of re-production. Thus, the coin is an instance of causation by re-production, while the production of cream from milk is an instance of causation by simple manifestation.

Now, as to the origin of the world, there is a divergence of opinion among thinkers of different Schools: Some uphold the Theory of Creation, others maintain the Theory of Evolution. Among the Creationists are counted the Nâstikas or Nihilists, the Buddhists, and the Naiyâyikas; and among the Evolutionists, the Vedântins and the Sâmkhyas. The Nâstikas hold that the world is non-existent, that is, unreal, and that it came out of what was not; the Buddhists hold that the world is existent, that is, real, and that it came out of what was not; the Naiyâyikas hold that the world is non-existent, that is, non-eternal, perishable, and that it came out of the existent, that is, what is eternal, imperishable; the Vedântins hold that the world is non-existent, that is, unreal, and that it came out of what was existent, that is, real, namely, *Brahman*; and the Sâmkhyas hold that the world is existent, that is, real, and that it came out of what was existent, that is, real, namely, the *Pradhâna*. Thus, there are the *A-Sat-Kârya-Vâda* of the Nâstikas that a non-existent world has been produced from a non-existent cause, and of the Buddhists that an existent world has been produced from a non-existent cause, the *Abhâva-Utpatti-Vâda* of the Naiyâyikas that a non-eternal world has been produced from an eternal cause, the *Vivarta-Vâda* of the Vedântins that the world is a revolution, an illusory appearance, of the one eternal reality, viz., *Brahman*, and the *Sat-Kârya-Vâda* of the Sâmkhyas that an existent world has been produced from an existent cause.

Against the theories of *A-Sat-Kârya*, *Abhâva-Utpatti*, and *Vivarta*, and in support of their theory of *Sat-Kârya*, the Sâmkhyas advance the following arguments:

Arguments which establish the Sâmkhya Theory.

- I. There can be no production of what is absolutely non-existent; e.g., a man's horn.
- II. There must be some determinate material cause for every product. Cream, for instance, can form on milk only, and never on water. Were it as absolutely non-existent in milk as it is in water, there would be no reason why it should form on milk, and not equally on water.
- III. The relation of cause and effect is that of the producer and the produced, and the simplest conception of the cause as the producer is that it possesses the potentiality of becoming the effect,

and this potentiality is nothing but the unrealised state of the effect.

IV. The effect is seen to possess the nature of the cause, *e.g.*, a coin still possesses the properties of the gold of which it is made.

V. Matter is indestructible; "destruction" means disappearance into the cause.

It follows, therefore, that cause and effect are neither absolutely dissimilar nor absolutely similar to each other. They possess *essential* similarities and *formal* dissimilarities. Such being the relation between cause and effect, the world cannot possibly have come out of something in which it had been absolutely non-existent, and which accordingly was, in relation to it, as good as non-existent. For the world is neither absolutely unreal nor absolutely real. The test of objective reality is its opposition to consciousness. It is distinguished as *Prâtibhāsika* or apparent, *Vyāvahārika* or practical or phenomenal, and *Pāramārthika* or transcendental. Of these, the world possesses phenomenal reality, and must, therefore, have a transcendental reality as its substratum. Thus is the Doctrine of *Sat-Kārya* established.

A natural corollary from the above doctrine is the other doctrine of Transformation. It is the doctrine that, as all effects are contained in their causes in an unmanifested form, the "production" of an effect is nothing but its manifestation, and that, as cause and effect are essentially identical, an effect is merely a transformation of the cause.

Now, the question arises, whether the cause of the world be a single one, or whether it be manifold. Some think that, according to the Naiyāyikas, who declare the existence of *Parama-Ātman* or the ordinary Atoms of Matter, the world has sprung from a plurality of causes. This is, however, to take a very superficial view of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Darśana. The Naiyāyikas were certainly not timid explorers of metaphysical truths; there is absolutely no reason for supposing that they either would not or could not penetrate behind and beyond the ordinary Atoms of Matter. As I have elsewhere pointed out, it would be a mistake to treat the six Darśanas as each being a complete and self-contained system of thought; in respect of their scope and purpose, they bear no analogy to the philosophies of the West. They are singly neither universal nor final; but they mutually supplement one another. Their Risis address themselves to particular sets of people possessing different degrees of mental and spiritual advancement. They reveal

and explain the truths embodied in the Vedas to them from their point of view and according to their competence, and thus help them in realising the truths for themselves and thereby in progressing towards Self-realisation. If the Naiyâyikas, therefore, do not carry their analysis of the world further than the ordinary Atoms of Matter, it must not be assumed that they teach a sort of atomic pluralism as the ultimate theory of the origin of the world, and are in this opposed to the authors of the other Sâstras which teach a different origin. The right explanation is that they make but a partial declaration of the Vedic truths and cut short the process of resolution at the ordinary Atoms of Matter, because they address themselves to a class of students who do not possess the mental capacity to grasp subtler truths.

For the sense of unity which has found expression in the Law of Unity of the Cause of Parsimony, points to a single original of the world the World. or material manifestation, as revealed in the Vedas. And the Sâmkhya makes its students acquainted with this. It is called the Root, and is described as the *Pradhâna*, that in which all things are contained, and as *Prakriti*, the mother of things.

It is a long way from the ordinary Atoms of Matter to the *Pradhâna* or Primordial Matter. The Sâmkhya undertakes to declare and expound the successive transformations of the *Pradhâna* down to the Gross Matter, with the object of accomplishing the complete isolation of the Self from even the most shadowy conjunction with the *Pradhâna*.

The definition of *Prakriti* is that it is the state of equilibrium of Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas, called the *Guṇas*.
 Definition of *Prakriti*. It is the genus of which the *Guṇas* are the species.
 Their state of equilibrium is their latent, potential, or inactive state, the state of not being developed into effects. The *Guṇas* are extremely fine substances, and are respectively the principles of illumination, evolution, and involution, and the causes of pleasure, pain, and dullness. For, Sattva is light and illuminating, Rajas is active and urgent, and Tamas is heavy and enveloping. They are in eternal and indissoluble conjunction with one another, and, by nature, mutually overpower, support, produce, and intimately mix with, one another.

This doctrine of the Three *Guṇas* is the very foundation of the Sâmkhya Tantra. It is explained in the following manner: (1) Everything in the world, external as well as internal, is in constant change; and there can be no change, whether it be movement in space, or whether it

The Doctrine of the Three *Guṇas*.

be movement in time, without rest. Side by side, therefore, with the principle of mutation, there must be a principle of conservation. And, as Berkeley tells us, existence is perception,—whatever is not manifested to Consciousness, individual or universal, does not exist. Another principle is, therefore, required which would make the manifestation of the other two principles and of their products, (as also of itself and of its own), to Consciousness possible. Thus, at the origin of the world, there must be a principle of conservation, a principle of mutation, and a principle of manifestation. (2) Similarly, an examination of the intra-organic energies would disclose the existence of three distinct principles behind them. These energies are the eleven Indriyas or Powers of Cognition and Action, and Prâṇa or Vital Force. Among them, the Powers of Cognition, *e.g.*, Seeing, Hearing, etc., cause manifestation of objects, the Powers of Action, *e.g.*, seizing by the hand, etc., produce change, and Prâṇa conserves and preserves life. (3) In the mind, again, modifications of three distinct characters take place; *viz.*, cognition, conation, and retention; and these could not be possible without there being a principle of manifestation, a principle of mutation, and a principle of conservation respectively. (4) Likewise, a psycho-aesthetic analysis of our worldly experience yields the result that everything in the universe possesses a threefold aspect, that is, it may manifest as agreeable, or as disagreeable, or as neutral, *i.e.*, neither agreeable nor disagreeable. It must then have derived these characteristics from its cause; for nothing can be in the effect which was not in the cause. The principles of manifestation, mutation, and conservation, therefore, which are operative in the change of the states of agreeable, disagreeable, and neutral, must also possess the nature of being pleasant (*śānta*), unpleasant (*ghora*), and dull (*mûḍha*).

It is these principles of manifestation, mutation, and conservation, possessing the nature of pleasure, pain, and dullness, that are respectively the *Guṇas*, *Sattva*, *Rajas*, and *Tamaś*, of the *Sāṃkhyas*. They are the constitutive elements of *Prakṛiti*. They are *Guṇas* in their manifested forms; they are *Prakṛiti* in their unmanifested form.

The transformations of *Prakṛiti* are either *prakṛiti-vikṛiti*, original or evolvent as well as modification or evolute, or *vikṛiti*, modification or evolute merely. The former are themselves transformations of their antecedents, and, in their turn, give rise to subsequent transformations. They are *Mahat*, *Ahaṃkāra*, and the five *Tan-mâtras*. The latter are the eleven *Indriyas* and the five gross Elements. The transformation of *Prakṛiti* ceases with them. Of course, the gross Elements combine and evolve the

The Transformations
of *Prakṛiti* enumerated
and distinguished.

material world ; but the world is not a different Tattva or principle from the Elements, because it does not develop a single attribute which is not already possessed by them. For the test of a Tattva or original or ultimate principle is that it possesses a characteristic property which is not possessed by any other Tattva.

The objective world thus contains twenty-four Tattvas, namely, Prakṛiti, Mahat, Ahaṁ-kāra, Manas, the five Indriyas of Cognition, the five Indriyas of Action, the five Tan-mâtras, and the five gross Elements.

The Objective World consists of Twenty-four Tattvas.

At the beginning of creation, there arises in Prakṛiti *Spandana* or cosmic vibration which disturbs its state of equilibrium, and releases the Guṇas from quiescence.

The Transformation of Prakṛiti is Mahat or Buddhi.

Rajas at once acts upon Sattva and manifests it as Mahat. Mahat denotes Buddhi, the material counterpart and basis of what we term Understanding or Reason. Buddhi is called Mahat, great, because it is the principal among the instruments of Cognition and Action. Mahat also means "light"; it is derived from the Vedic word *Mahas* or *Maghas*, meaning light. And Buddhi is called Mahat, because it is the initial transformation of Sattva which is the principle of manifestation. Or, Buddhi which is the first manifestation of the Guṇas and which is the material cause of the world, is called Mahat, in order to distinguish it from individual or finite Buddhis which are its parts. For "what is the Buddhi of the first-born golden-egged (Brahmâ), the same is the primary basis of all Buddhis; it is here called the 'great self.'"

Universal and Individual Buddhis distinguished.

The function of Buddhi is *Adhyavasâya* or certainty leading to action. It manifests in eight forms; viz., as virtue, knowledge, dispassion and power, while Sattva is predominant in it, and as vice, ignorance, passion, and weakness, while Tamas is predominant in it. And these, again, are modified into innumerable forms, which are classified as Error, Incapacity, Complacency, and Perfection. Such is Pratyaya-sarga or the creation of Buddhi or intellectual creation as contra distinguished from elemental creation.

Definition of Buddhi.

From Buddhi springs Ahaṁ-kāra: from "*cogito*," I think, "*sum*," I am. Ahaṁ-kāra is literally the I-maker. It is the material counterpart and basis of what we term egoism, and causes modifications of Buddhi in the forms of "I am," "I do," etc., etc. It is the principle of personal identity and of individuation. Its function is *Abhimâna*, conceit, thinking with reference to itself, assumption of things to itself. But it is not a mere function; it is a substance

The Transformation of Buddhi is Ahaṁ-kāra.

in which reside *Vāsanās* or the resultant tendencies of accumulated experience, and which is capable of modification into other and grosser forms.

This Ahaṃ-kāra, which is the first transformation of Buddhi, is the cosmic Ahaṃ-kāra, the Upādhi or adjunct of the golden-egged Brahmā, the Creator. It is the infinite source of the finite Ahaṃ-kāras of individual Jīvas.

The modification of Ahaṃ-kāra is twofold, according as it is influenced by Sattva or by Tamas. The Sāttvic modifications are the eleven Indriyas, that is, the five Indriyas of Cognition, *viz.*, the powers located in the Eye, Ear, Nose, Tongue, and Skin, the five Indriyas of Action, *viz.*, the powers located in the voice, hand, feet, and the organs of generation and of excretion, and Manas. Manas is both a power of cognition and a power of action. Assimilation and differentiation are its distinctive functions.

The Tāmasic modifications of Ahaṃ-kāra are the five Tan-mâtras, *viz.*, of Sound, Touch, Form, Flavour and Smell. They are pure, subtle or simple elements, the metaphysical parts of the ordinary Atoms of Matter. They are "fine substances," to quote from Vijñāna Bhikṣu, "the undifferentiated (a-viśeṣa) originals of the Gross Elements, which form the substratum of Sound, Touch, Form, Flavour and Smell, belonging to that class (that is, in that stage of their evolution) in which the distinctions of Śānta (pleasant), etc., do not exist." The process of their manifestation is as follows: The Tan-mâtra of Sound, possessing the attribute of Sound, is produced from Ahaṃ-kāra; then, from the Tan-mâtras of Sound, accompanied by Ahaṃ-kāra, is produced the Tan-mâtra of Touch, possessing the attributes of Sound and Touch. In a similar manner, the other Tan-mâtras are produced, in the order of their mention, by the addition of one more attribute at each successive step.

The transformations of the Tan-mâtras are the Gross Elements of Ether, Air, Fire, Water, and Earth,—the ordinary Atoms of Matter, in which appear for the first time the distinctions of being pleasant, painful, and neutral. All Bodies, from that of Brahmā down to a stock, are formed of them.


Now, all this objective world is non-intelligent, because its material cause, Prakṛiti, is non-intelligent. It does not, therefore, exist or energise for its own sake. There must be some one else of a different nature,

How the Existence of a Subjective Principle, Puruṣa, is explained.

some intelligent being, for whose benefit, *i.e.*, experience and freedom, all this activity of Prakṛiti is. Thus do the Sâṃkhyas explain the existence of Puruṣa.

The Twenty five
Tattvas.

To classify the Tattvas logically, they may be exhibited thus :



Of these, Puruṣa is the principle of Being, Prakṛiti is the principle of Becoming: Puruṣa eternally is, never becomes, while Prakṛiti is essentially Movement; even during *Pralaya* or Cosmic Dissolution, its activity does not altogether cease; it then undergoes homogeneous transformation: Sattva modifying as Sattva, Rajas modifying as Rajas, and Tamas modifying as Tamas. Puruṣa, on the other hand, is eternal consciousness undisturbed. Nothing can come into him, nothing can go out of him; he is *Kūṭa-stha*, dwelling in the cave. And these two eternal co-ordinate principles

The Spontaneity of are in eternal conjunction with each other. But Prakṛiti. conjunction as such does not set Prakṛiti in movement. Creation is caused by *Rāga* or Passion. *Rāga* is a change of state which spontaneously takes place in the Rajas of Buddhi, through the influence of Dharma and A-dharma. These are the natural consequences of the previous changes in the transformations of Prakṛiti,

and they reside in Ahaṃ-kāra in the form of *Vāsanâ* or tendency, and render impure the Sattva of Buddhi. The activity of Prakṛiti, in the form of the disturbance of its Rajas element, is spontaneously evoked for the purpose of working out and exhausting the stored up *Vāsanâ*; its successive transformation is really a process of purification of the Sattva of Buddhi. This spontaneous tendency towards purification is due to the vicinity of Puruṣa.

The Sâṃkhyas constantly hammer on the theme that no pain, no suffering, no bondage ever belongs to Puruṣa. Puruṣa is eternally free, never bound, never released. And because they thus thoroughly reveal the nature of Puruṣa, their doctrine is described as the Sâṃkhya, thorough-revealer.

The "experience" of Puruṣa consists in his being the indifferent spectator of the changes that take place in Buddhi; his "bondage" is nothing but the reflection on him of the bondages, that is, the impurities, of Buddhi; his "release" is merely the removal of this reflection which, again, depends upon the recovery by Buddhi of its state of pristine purity, which means its dissolution into Prakṛiti. To say that the activity of Prakṛiti is for the benefit of Puruṣa is, therefore, a mere figure of speech. It is really for the purification of the Sattva of Buddhi.

To think, as people generally do, that pleasure and pain, release and bondage really belong to Puruṣa, is a mistake pure and simple. It is *A-vidyâ*. *A-viveka* is the cause of *A-vidyâ*. And *A-viveka*, non-discrimination, is the failure to discriminate Puruṣa from Prakṛiti and her products. Many are ignorant of the very existence of Puruṣa. Many are ignorant of his exact nature: some identify him with Prakṛiti, some with Maḥat, some with Ahaṃ-kāra, and so on. Many, again, know the Tattvas in some form or other, but they know them not: knowledge, in the sense of mere information, they have, but no realisation, and it is realisation which matters. The Sâṃkhya, for this reason, enters into a detailed examination of the *Tattvas*, their number, nature, function, effect, inter-relation, resemblance, difference, etc., and insists on *Tattva-abhyâsa* or the habitual contemplation of the *Tattvas*, so that they may be *Sâkṣât-kṛita* or immediately known or realised. The way is also shown as to how, and the means, too, whereby, to discriminate, on the one hand, the gross Elements from the Tan-mâtras, the Tan-mâtras from the Indriyas, and both from Ahaṃ-kāra, Ahaṃ-kāra from Buddhi, and Buddhi

from Puruṣa, and, on the other hand, to discriminate Puruṣa from the gross and subtle Bodies and to prevent their further identification.

The Yoga which is the practice of the Sāṃkhya, which is the theory, takes up, and starts from, these central teachings of its predecessor, *viz.* (1) All activity—all change—is in and of Prakṛiti. (2) No activity—no change—is in Puruṣa. (3) The modifications of the mind are reflected in Puruṣa, and make him look like modified. (4) When the mind is calm and purified, Puruṣa shines as he really is. (5) Save and except these, reflection and its removal, bondage and release do not belong to Puruṣa. (6) Bondage and release are really of Prakṛiti, or, more strictly speaking, of the individualised form of its first transformation, *viz.*, Buddhi. From the point of view of the philosophy of the history of the Darśanas, these are the last words of the Sāṃkhya.

The Sāṃkhya also has brought the doctrine of Sūkṣma or Liṅga Śarīra, the Subtle Body, prominently to the fore. For, the purification of the Sattva of Buddhi may not be, and, as a general rule, is not, possible in one life, nor in one region of the Universe. But death seems to put an untimely end to the process of purification, by destroying the gross Body. How then can the process of purification be continued in other lives and in other regions? The Sāṃkhya replies that it can be and is so continued by means of the Subtle Body. It is composed of the seventeen *Tattvas*, beginning with Buddhi and ending with the Tan-mātras. It is produced, at the beginning of Creation, one for each Puruṣa, and lasts till the time of Mahâ-Pralaya or the Great Dissolution. It is altogether unconfined, such that it may ascend to the sun dancing on its beams, and can penetrate through a mountain. And it transmigrates from one gross Body to another, from one region of the Universe to another, being perfumed with, and carrying the influence of, the *Bhâvas* or dispositions of Buddhi characterised as virtue, knowledge, dispassion, and power, and their opposites.

The Sāṃkhyas, again, teach a plurality of Puruṣas. This topic has been very fully discussed in the *Sāṃkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram*, I. 149-159, and the commentaries. Therein Vijñâna Bhikṣu has mercilessly criticised the doctrine of Non-duality maintained by some of the Vedântins, and has sought to establish the plurality of Puruṣas. And Garbe, in his characteristic style, contents himself with a flippant criticism of Vijñâna Bhikṣu's explanations. But Vijñâna Bhikṣu's criticisms are not aimed principally against the unity of Puruṣas, but at those interpretations of it, according

to which the empirical Puruṣas, that is, mundane Puruṣas, the plurality of whom is established by irrefutable arguments, as in the Sâṃkhya Śâstra, are reduced to mere shadows without substance. He does not so much attack the unadulterated *A-Dvaita* of the Vedas and the Upaniṣats as its later developments. He was fully aware of the fact that none of the six Darśanas, for example, was, as we have hinted more than once, a complete system of philosophy in the Western sense, but merely a catechism explaining, and giving a reasoned account of, some of the truths revealed in the Vedas and Upaniṣats, to a particular class of students, confining the scope of its enquiry within the province of Creation, without attempting to solve to them the transcendental riddles of the Universe, which, in their particular stage of mental and spiritual development, it would have been impossible for them to grasp. Similarly, Garbe is wrong in thinking that Vijñâna Bhikṣu “explains away the doctrine of absolute monism.” It is only a matter of interpretation and of stand-point; compare Râmânuja, Madhva, etc. For Vijñâna does not hesitate to do away even with the duality of Prakṛiti and Puruṣa when he observes that all the other *Tattvas* enter into absorption in Puruṣa and rest there in a subtle form, as does energy in that which possesses it. (*Vide* his Commentary on S-P-S., I. 61). For an explanation, therefore, of the apparent contradictions in the Darśanas, one must turn to the Vedas and Upaniṣats and writings of a similar scope and character. The Bhagavat-Gîtâ, for instance, declares :—

द्वाविमौ पुरुषौ लोके क्षरश्चाक्षर एव च ।

क्षरः सर्वाणि भूतानि कूटस्थोऽक्षर उच्यते ॥ १५ । १६ ॥

उत्तमः पुरुषस्त्वन्यः परमात्मेत्युदाहृतः ।

यो लोकत्रयमाविश्य विभर्त्यव्यय ईश्वरः ॥ १५ । १७ ॥

In the world there are these two Puruṣas only, the mutable and the immutable. The mutable is all created things; the intelligent experiencer is said to be the immutable.—XV. 16.

While the highest Puruṣa is a different one, who (in the Upaniṣats) is called the Parama-Âtmâ, the Supreme Self, and who, presiding over the three worlds, preserves them, as the undecaying, omniscient, omnipotent Îśvara.—XV. 17.

Along such lines the so-called contradictions of the Darśanas find their reconciliation and true explanation in the higher teachings of the Upaniṣats.

It will probably be contended that, in the case in question, such reconciliation is impossible in view of “one of the fundamental doctrines of the genuine Sâṃkhya, which

The Sâṃkhya does not deny the Existence of God.

is the denial of God" (Garbe). No graver blunder has ever been committed by any student of the Sâṃkhya! The genuine Sâṃkhya no more denies the existence of God than does Garbe's illustrious countryman, Emmanuel Kant, in his *Critique of Pure Reason*. To make this position clear, let us paraphrase the *Sâṃkhya-Pravachana-Sûtram* on the subject. Thus, Īśvara is not a subject of proof (I. 92). For, we must conceive Īśvara as being either *Mukta*, free, or *Baddha*, bound. He can be neither free nor bound; because, in the former case, being perfect, He would have nothing to fulfil by creation, and, in the latter case, He would not possess absolute power (I.93-94). No doubt, in the *Śrutis*, we find such declarations as "He is verily the all-knower, the creator of all," and the like; these, however, do not allude to an eternal, uncaused Īśvara (God), but are only eulogies of such Jīvas or Incarnate Selves as are going to be freed, or of the Yogins, human as well as super-human, who have attained perfection by the practice of Yoga (I. 95). Some say that attainment of the highest end results through absorption into the Cause (III. 54). But this is not so, because, as people rise up again after immersion into water, so do Puruṣas, merged into Prakṛiti at the time of *Pralaya*, appear, again, at the next Creation, as Īśvaras (III. 54-55). The Vedic declarations, *e. g.*, "He is verily the all-knower, the creator of all," refer to such Highest Selves (III. 56).

Neither is the existence of God as the moral governor of the world, proved; for, if God Himself produce the consequences of acts, He would do so even without the aid of Karma; on the other hand, if His agency in this respect be subsidiary to that of Karma, then let Karma itself be the cause of its consequences; what is the use of a God? Moreover, it is impossible that God should be the dispenser of the consequences of acts. For, His motive will be either egoistic or altruistic. But it cannot be the latter, as it is simply inconceivable that one acting for the good of others, should create a world so full of pain. Nor can it be the former; because (1) in that case, He would possess unfulfilled desires, and, consequently, suffer pain and the like. Thus your worldly God would be no better than our Highest Selves. (2) Agency cannot be established in the absence of desire, for, behind every act, there lies an intense desire. And to attribute intense desire to God would be to take away from his eternal freedom. (3) Further, desire is a particular product of Prakṛiti. It cannot, therefore, naturally grow within the Self, whether it be God or the Jīva; it must come from the outside. Now, it cannot be said that desire, which is an evolute of Prakṛiti, directly has connection with the Self, as it would contradict hundreds of

Vedic declarations to the effect that the Self is *Asaṅga*, absolutely free from attachment or association. Neither can it be maintained that Prakṛiti establishes connection of desire with the Self by induction, as it were, through its mere proximity to it; as this would apply equally to all the Selves at the same time (V. 2-9). Furthermore, the above arguments might have lost their force or relevancy, were there positive proof of the existence of God; but there is no such proof. For, proof is of three kinds, *viz.*, Perception, Inference and Testimony. Now, God certainly is not an object of perception. Neither can He be known by Inference; because there is no general proposition (Vyâpti) whereby to infer the existence of God, inasmuch as; Prakṛiti alone being the cause of the world, the law of causation is of no avail here. And the testimony of the Veda speaks of Prakṛiti as being the origin of the world, and hence does not prove the existence of God (V. 10-12).

Thus the Sâṃkhyas maintain that it cannot be proved by evidence that an eternal, self-caused God exists; that the ordinary means of proof, Perception, Inference and Testimony, fail to reach Him; and that there is no other means of correct knowledge on our plane of the Universe. And when, therefore, Kapila thus declares that the various objective arguments for the establishment of theism, *viz.*, the ontological, the cosmological, the teleological, and the moral, cannot stand, and pronounces the verdict of 'non-proven' in regard to the existence of God, he takes up the right philosophical attitude, and there is absolutely no justification for branding his doctrine as atheistical merely on this score. "The notion that the existence of God is susceptible of dialectic demonstration has been surrendered, in later times," as Mr. Fitz-Edward Hall remarks, "by most Christian theologians of any credit: it now being, more ordinarily, maintained that our conviction of deity, on grounds apart from revelation, reposes solely on original consciousness, antecedent to all proof."

Thus the Sâṃkhya is *Nir-Īśvara*, but not *Nâstika*. It is not *Nâstika*, atheistical, because it does not deny the existence of God. It is *Nir-Īśvara*, *lit.* god-less, as it explains all and every fact of experience without reference to, and without invoking the intervention of, a divine agency. Those who imagine that, in the Sâṃkhya, there is a denial of God, obviously fail to recognize the distinction between the two words, *Nâstika* and *Nir-Īśvara*. They, further, fail to bear in mind that the Sanskrit *Īśvara* and the English *God* are not synonymous terms. For, the opposite of *Nâstika* is *Āstika* (believer), one who believes in the existence of God, the authority of the

Nir-Īśvara and *Nâstika* are not convertible terms.

Veda, immortality, and so forth. Accordingly, the Hindu Darśanas have been classified as being either “*Āstika*” or “*Nāstika*,” and the “*Nir-Īśvara*” Sāṃkhya has been always regarded as falling under the former category.

DALTONGANJ :

The 15th February, 1915.

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